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JURISDICTION 
The Supreme Court has original appellate 
jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to Utah Code 
Annotated, 1953 as amended, § 78-2-2 (3) (j) . 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Issue: Must a "cure" of a default in a real 
estate contract be in the form of a written agreement 
or can the "cure" be accomplished by part performance 
or by oral agreement? 
Standard of Review: Whether a cure of a 
default can be accomplished by part performance or by 
oral agreement is a legal question of first impression 
in Utah which is reviewed under a correction of error 
standard, with no deference accorded to the trial court 
determination. United Park City Mines Co. v. Greater 
Park City Co., 870 P.2d 880, 885 (Utah 1993). 
Preserved for Appeal: The DeWitts preserved 
the right to appeal by filing a Rule 52(b) motion to 
amend findings and ruling granting a directed verdict 
(R. 269). 
2. Issue: Should the directed verdict against the 
DeWitts be vacated on the basis of estoppel and part 
performance? 
Standard of Review: Because this court is 
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reviewing a case decided on a directed verdict, the 
appellate court's standard of review is the same as 
that imposed upon the trial court. The evidence must 
be examined in the light most favorable to the losing 
party, and if there is a reasonable basis in the 
evidence and in the inferences to be drawn therefrom 
that would support a judgment in favor of the losing 
party, the directed verdict cannot be sustained. 
Management Comm. Of Graystone Pine Homeowners Ass'n ex. 
rel. Owners of Condominiums v. Graystone Pines, Inc., 
652 P.2d 896 (Utah 1982). 
The appellate court should sustain the granting of 
a motion for a directed verdict only if the evidence 
was such that reasonable men could not arrive at a 
different conclusion. Anderson v. Gribble, 30 Utah 2d 
68, 513 P.2d 432 (1973). 
Preserved for Appeal: The DeWitts preserved 
the right to appeal by filing a Rule 52(b) motion to 
amend findings and amend ruling granting a directed 
verdict (R. 269). 
3. Issue: Does a lis pendens remain valid during the 
pendency of an appeal? 
Standard of Review: Whether a lis pendens 
remains valid during the pendency of an appeal is a 
question of law which is reviewed under a correction of 
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error standard, with no deference accorded to the trial 
court's determination. United Park City Mines Co. v. 
Greater Park City Co., 870 P.2d 880, 885 (Utah 1993). 
Preserved for Appeal: The DeWitts preserved 
the right to appeal by filing a Rule 52(b) motion to 
amend findings and amend ruling granting a directed 
verdict (R. 269). 
RELEVANT STATUTES 
Utah Code Ann. § 25-5-8: 
Right to specific performance not affected. 
Nothing in this chapter contained shall be 
construed to abridge the powers of courts to 
compel the specific performance of agreements 
in case of part performance thereof. 
Utah Code Ann. § 57-1-31(2): 
Trust deeds - Default in performance of 
obligations secured - Reinstatement 
Cancellation of recorded notice of default. 
(2) If the default is cured and the trust 
deed reinstated in the manner provided in 
Subsection (1), the beneficiary, or his 
assignee, shall, on demand of any person 
having an interest in the trust property, 
execute and deliver to him a request to the 
trustee to execute, acknowledge, and deliver 
a cancellation of the recorded notice of 
default under such trust deed; and any 
beneficiary under a trust deed, or his 
assignee, who, for a period of 30 days after 
such demand, refuses to request the trustee 
to execute and deliver such cancellation is 
liable to the person entitled to such request 
for all damages resulting from such refusal. 
A release and reconveyance given by the 
trustee or beneficiary, or both, or the 
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execution of a trustee's deed constitutes a 
cancellation of a notice of default. 
Otherwise, a cancellation of a recorded 
notice of default under a trust deed is, when 
acknowledged, entitled to be recorded and is 
sufficient if made and executed by the 
trustee in substantially the following form: 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case. 
The DeWitts purchased a home from Mr. Grossen 
pursuant to a real estate purchase contract (R. 314). 
The DeWitts fell behind on their payments, taxes, and 
insurance, and Mr. Grossen recorded a notice of default 
(R. 314). After the foreclosure sale was noticed up, 
but before the sale occurred, the DeWitts' brother, 
Ogden, met with Mr. Grossen regarding a cure of the 
default on the property (R. 313). 
Ogden DeWitt made the two payments to Mr. 
Grossen, as agreed, for all back-due payments (R. 312). 
Mr. Grossen accepted the checks without protest, but 
did not cash them (R. 312). Then Mr. Grossen went 
forward with the foreclosure sale (R. 312). 
The DeWitts lost a home appraised at about $90,000 
when the balance owing on the purchase contract was 
about $35,000. The trial court directed a verdict 
against the DeWitts on the basis of the statute of 
frauds (R. 311). 
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B. Course of Proceedings Below. 
This matter came to trial before the Honorable 
Judge Schofield, of the Fourth District Court on March 
20, 1997, and again on April 7, 1997. At the 
conclusion of the DeWitt's case on the counterclaim, 
Earl Grossen moved for a directed verdict on the 
grounds that the oral agreement between Earl Grossen 
and Ogden DeWitt, even if proved, was unenforceable 
under the Statute of Frauds (R. 220). On May 6, 1997, 
the district court entered it Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law, granting the directed verdict (R. 
232). On June 3, 1997, the DeWitts filed a Rule 52(b) 
Motion to Amend Findings and Amend Ruling Granting a 
Directed Verdict (R. 269). On September 5, 1997, the 
trial court issued a ruling denying the defendants' 
first Rule 52(b) Motion (R. 308). On September 25, 
1997, the trial court entered its Amended Findings of 
Fact and Conclusions of Law (R. 315). 
C. Statement of Facts. 
1. On June 1, 1993, Derel K. DeWitt and Afton H. 
DeWitt executed a trust deed note and trust deed in 
favor of Earl Grossen and Mary Ada Grossen (now 
deceased)(R. 314). 
2. The note was secured by the trust deed and was 
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recorded on June 2, 1993, against certain property 
located at 30 North 100 West, Payson, Utah (R. 314). 
3. On September 19, 1995, David Crabtree, as 
successor trustee under the trust deed, executed a 
notice of default and commenced non-judicial 
foreclosure proceedings of the trust deed pursuant to 
Utah Code Annotated, § 57-1-19, et. seq. The notice of 
default set forth three defaults: 1) payment of the 
note was delinquent in the amount of $1,011.32 as of 
September 12, 1995; 2) property taxes to the property 
were due and owing; 3) there was not adequate fire 
insurance on the property (R. 314). 
4. On or about January 25, 1996, Ogden DeWitt, 
the brother of Derel K. DeWitt and son of Afton H. 
DeWitt, contacted Earl Grossen, the beneficiary under 
the trust deed by telephone. Earl Grossen and Ogden 
Dewitt reached an agreement regarding the payment of 
the arrearage which Earl Grossen stated was in the 
amount of $1,617 and that taxes needed to be paid and 
the property need to be insured (R. 313). 
5. Ogden DeWitt agreed to pay $1,617 in two 
payments, one of $1,000 by the following Monday and one 
of $617 paid by the end of the next week (R. 313). 
6. Ogden DeWitt tendered both the $1,000 and the 
-6 
$617 check to Earl Grossen as per their agreement (R. 
312) . 
7. Earl Grossen accepted the checks without 
protest, but, unknown to the DeWitts at the time, did 
not cash them (R. 312). 
8. Mr. Grossen admitted in the trial at least 19 
times under oath that a deal had been struck with Ogden 
DeWitt. He specifically admitted, "I struck a deal 
with him [Ogden DeWitt] that was verbal. . ." 
(Transcript of bench trial, page 102, R. 504). See also 
R. 471—"redemption or a deal to get the property 
up-to-date" 
R. 471—"precluded the deal from happening" 
R. 471—"I struck a deal with him that was verbal" 
R. 470—"Told him the deal was off several times" 
R. 469—"the deal was off" 
R. 4 69—"the verbal agreement was over' 
R. 463—"no deal to proceed and I canceled it" 
R. 462—"deal was off" 
R. 458—"deal was totally off" 
R. 458—"deal was off" 
R. 447—"I canceled it" [the verbal agreement] 
R. 441—"the deal was off" 
R. 441—"we talked about a deal" 
R. 439—"it [the agreement] was tentative in my 
mind 
R. 435"Told him the deal was off" 
R. 435—"The tentative agreement—vegbe&ment" 
R. 466—"Q. did you agree to accept those monetary 
amounts as payments?" A. ". . . yes." 
R. 447—"An agreement with . . . DeWitt" 
R. 439—"this agreement you had with Ogden DeWitt" 
9. Similarly, Mr. Grossen admitted in his 
deposition at least 20 times under oath that a deal had 
been struck with Ogden DeWitt. 
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13-18—"the deal was off" 
14-01—"I told him that there was no deal" 
14-06—"the deal was that the back taxes weren't 
paid" 
14-15—"I told him the deal was off" 
17-22—"I was at that time more willing to go 
along with his proposal" 
18-04—"the word of mouth deal, the deal we 
discussed on the phone," 
18-06—Q. Okay. And that was regarding the cure 
of the default on the property? 
A. Uh-huh (affirmative). And as I recall, those 
amounts were for payments that they hadn't made 
and late payments. 
Q. So you had discussed amounts that—in coming 
up with this deal, you had discussed amounts that 
he would need to produce or give to you, tender to 
you? 
A. As I recall, yeah, that's what we talked 
about. 
Q. So the amounts of the checks that he had given 
you were in the amounts that you agreed upon in 
this deal? 
A. Yeah, up to that time. 
27-13—"the deal was off" 
28-16—"I told him the deal was off" 
31-18—"the verbal agreement" he had with Mr. 
DeWitt. . . 
32-24—"I agreed verbally." 
35-06—"I told him that I had made a verbal 
agreement with Mr. DeWitt and the deal was off" 
39-06—"It was a verbal agreement" 
39-17—"I think that there was a verbal agreement 
to accept his check at the time" 
39-21—"I think there was a verbal agreement" 
40-15—"I agreed to wait" 
41-19—"There was some kind of agreement obviously 
because I accepted the check." 
50-02—"the verbal agreement" 
56-11—"I was not going to go through with the 
verbal agreement that we had made over the phone" 
56-21—"I had tentatively agreed verbally to allow 
him to make part of the payments in the two 
installments basically" 
(Deposition of Earl L. Grossen Exhibit A) . 
10. On February 29, 1996, at 10:00 a.m., the
 : 
trustee for Earl Grossen held a trustee's sale at the 
-8-
appointed time and place and no other bidders being 
present, bid in the amount then due and owing under the 
trust deed note. A trustee's deed was then executed by 
David Crabtree, as successor trustee, conveying the 
property to Earl Grossen (R. 312). 
11. Earl Grossen foreclosed on the property in 
question when the DeWitts were current on the house 
payments. 
12. Earl Grossen went forward with the 
foreclosure sale on the basis that 1) he later 
discovered an additional alleged default that he did 
not know about when he struck the deal; and 2) the 
taxes and insurance had not been paid (R. 312). 
13. On March 22, 1996, Earl Grossen served Afton 
H. DeWitt and Derel K. DeWitt with a 5-day notice to 
quit. At the end of the five days the defendants 
remained in possession of the property and on April 1, 
1996, Earl Grossen filed an unlawful detainer action 
against the DeWitts seeking to regain possession (R. 
230) . 
14. On April 8, 1996, Afton H. DeWitt and Derel 
K. DeWitt filed a counterclaim seeking to set aside the 
trustee's sale on the grounds that Ogden DeWitt made a 
binding contract with Earl Grossen which Grossen had 
breached by failing to cancel the trustee's sale (R. 
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229) . 
15. Afton H. DeWitt and Derel K. DeWitt have 
filed a lis pendens against the property (R. 229). 
16. At the conclusion of the hearing on the 
counterclaim, Earl Grossen moved for a directed verdict 
on the grounds that any oral agreement between Earl 
Grossen and Ogden DeWitt, even if proved, was 
unenforceable under the statute of frauds (R. 229). 
17. The DeWitts lost a home appraised at about 
$90,000 when the balance owing on the purchase contract 
was about $35,000 (R. 429). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Derel Dewitt and Afton Dewitt request this court 
reverse the trial court's judgment against them 
because: 
(1) there is no law requiring that a "cure" 
of a default be in writing; 
(2) even if a "cure" of a default must be in 
writing, the principles of estoppel and part 
performance take this case outside the 
statute of frauds; and 
(3) a lis pendens remains valid during the 
pendency of an appeal. 
The DeWitts are aware of no Utah case that has 
ever held that the statute of frauds bars enforcement 
of a contract that has been partially or fully 
performed especially when the party asserting the 
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statute of frauds has admitted under oath literally 
dozens of times that the contract existed (See 
Statement of Facts paragraphs nine and ten and Exhibit 
A). The statute of frauds is meant to prevent fraud, 
not perpetrate fraud. 
When the court issued its directed verdict on the 
statute of frauds, it did not have the benefit of 
briefing on the Utah case law and the very unique Utah 
statute that specifically allows for the part-
performance (estoppel) exception to the statute of 
frauds. 
Mr. Grossen admitted under oath, "I struck a deal 
with him [Ogden DeWitt] that was verbal." (Transcript 
of bench trial, page 102, R. 504). Hearing transcript, 
page 3, line 23. At page 8, line 17 (R. 466) of the 
hearing transcript, DeWitts' counsel asked: 
Q. And at the time of that conversation 
around January 25, did you agree to 
accept those monetary amounts as 
payments? 
A. Based on the facts that I knew at that 
time, yes. 
In 18 other instances in the trial, Mr. Grossen 
referred to the "deal" or "agreement" that he reached 
with Mr. DeWitt and Mr. Grossen's subsequent 
cancellation of that agreement. Similarly, in Mr. 
Grossen's deposition, he admitted at least an 
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additional 21 times, under oath, there was a "deal" 
"regarding the cure of the default on the property." 
Mr. Grossen even admitted to his attorney he "had made 
a verbal agreement with Mr. DeWitt . . . " (Deposition 
of Earl L. Grossen p. 35, 3-8, Appendix C)(See also 
Appendix A identifying the 41 times Grossen admitted a 
"deal" existed.) Having repeatedly admitted the 
existence of an "agreement" or a "deal," Utah law 
estops Mr. Grossen from now hiding behind the statute 
of frauds when his actions have led to the DeWitts' 
performance of their part of the "deal." 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS DOES NOT REQUIRE THAT A 
"CURE" OF A DEFAULT BE IN WRITING 
Utah Code Annotated, § 25-5-1 is the statute of 
frauds applicable to estates or interests in real 
property. The language of this section identifies the 
types of real estate contracts that must be in writing: 
(1) a contract that creates an "estate or interest" in 
real property, other than a leasehold interest for a 
term not exceeding one year; and (2) a contract that 
creates a "trust or power over or concerning real 
property." Given this statutory criteria, it does not 
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appear that an agreement for the "cure" of a default 
comes within the Utah statute of frauds. When Mr. 
Grossen set the terms for the cure of the default, he 
did not transfer an "estate or interest" in real 
property. The terms for the cure of the default set by 
the plaintiff did not include any granting, assigning, 
or surrendering of any "interest," "trust," or "power" 
over the real property in question that would require a 
"deed of conveyance in writing." 
Utah Code Ann., § 57-1-31(1), addressing cures of 
default, states that the trustor: 
. . . may pay to the beneficiary or his 
successor in interest the entire amount then 
due under the terms of the trust deed other 
than such portion of the principal as would 
not then be due had no default occurred, and 
thereby cure the default theretofore existing 
and, thereupon, all proceedings theretofore 
had or instituted shall be dismissed or 
discontinued and the obligation and trust 
deed shall be reinstated and shall be and 
remain in force and effect the same as if no 
such acceleration had occurred. [Emphasis 
added.] 
Nothing in this subsection requires that a writing be 
executed upon every cure of every default. The 
subsection provides that a cure occurs not when a 
written agreement is entered into, but when there is 
performance, i.e. payment. When the trustor performs, 
by paying, all foreclosure proceedings "shall be 
dismissed or discontinued." Historically and 
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practically, cures to default have not been required to 
be in writing. In the majority of the cases where a 
default has occurred, the monies tendered to cure the 
default are all that is provided. No written contract 
is signed. Another example of how a cure for a default 
would not be reduced to a written agreement is where a 
breach has occurred because the trustor has failed to 
maintain insurance or pay taxes on the property. If 
the trustor acquires insurance and provides the trustee 
or lender evidence of that insurance coverage, or pays 
the taxes, then a cure has been accomplished even 
though there are no written documents which would 
satisfy the statute of frauds. A separate written 
agreement is never produced. 
Utah Code Ann., § 57-1-31(2) goes on to state 
that: 
If the default is cured and the trust deed 
reinstated in the manner provided in 
subsection (1), the beneficiary, or his 
assignee, shall, on demand of any person 
having an interest in the trust property, 
execute and deliver a cancellation of the 
recorded notice of default under such trust 
deed . . . 
This subsection merely provides that the beneficiary of 
a trust deed shall provide a writing i^f a person having 
an interest in the property requests a written notice. 
The statute also provides that a cancellation of a 
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notice of default under a trust deed is "entitled to be 
recorded.'' But this statute does not state that a cure 
must be in writing nor that a cure must be recorded to 
be valid. Juxtaposing subsection (2) with subsection 
(1) makes it clear that a written cancellation is 
purely optional. The DeWitts are not aware of any Utah 
law which, when applied to the undisputed facts of this 
case, would require that the oral agreement to cure the 
default be in writing. 
Because this case was decided on a directed 
verdict, the appellate court's standard of review is 
the same as that imposed upon the trial court, it must 
examine the evidence in the light most favorable to the 
losing party, and if there is a reasonable basis in the 
evidence and in the inferences to be drawn therefrom 
that would support a judgment in favor of the losing 
party, the directed verdict cannot be sustained. 
Management Comm. Of Graystone Pine Homeowners Ass'n ex. 
rel. Owners of Condominiums v. Graystone Pines, Inc.. 
652 P.2d 896 (Utah 1982). In the case at bar the 
statutory and case law clearly support a judgment in 
favor of the DeWitts, therefore, the directed verdict 
should not be sustained. Even if the court cannot find 
that the facts and law clearly support a judgment in 
favor of the DeWitts, reasonable [people] could arrive 
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at different conclusions and, therefore, the directed 
verdict should not be sustained. Anderson v. Gribble, 
30 Utah 2d 68, 513 P.2d 432 (1973). 
POINT II. 
THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS SHOULD NOT BE USED AS A 
SWORD TO PERPETRATE A FRAUD. THEREFORE, PART 
PERFORMANCE OF AN ORAL CONTRACT NORMALLY 
WITHIN THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS CAN REMOVE IT 
FROM THE STATUTE 
The DeWitts believe the "deal" between Ogden 
DeWitt and the plaintiff to cure the default does not 
fall within the Utah statute of frauds. But even if 
this court were to hold otherwise, the doctrine of part 
performance works to avoid the statute. As early as 
1906, the Utah Supreme Court recognized that even a 
verbal agreement that normally would lie within the 
statute of frauds, if part-performed, can be enforced 
by a court of equity. Price v. Lloyd, 86 P.2d 7 67 
(Utah 1906). 
There is an abundance of Utah case law and other 
authority which supports the notion that the doctrine 
of part performance works to estop the assertion of the 
statute of frauds. In Jacobson v. Cox, 202 P.2d 714 
(Utah 1949), the supreme court addressed the estoppel 
issue in the context of real property. The court said, 
"We approach this question by directing attention to 
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the principle that the statute [of frauds] should be 
used for the purpose of preventing fraud and not as a 
shield by which fraud can be perpetrated.'' Id. This 
case is also relevant because, the contract was "silent 
as to the time of payment." The court then analyzed 
the interaction between the principle of estoppel and 
the statute of frauds as follows: 
In 49 American Jurisprudence, Section 581, 
the following principle in regard to estoppel 
is set forth: 
Closely allied to the principles of 
protection against the assertion of the 
statute of frauds to accomplish a fraud upon 
the party who acted in reliance upon an oral 
contract or the assertion of the statute as a 
shield to protect fraud is the doctrine of 
estoppel to assert the statute. It is 
universally conceded that the doctrine of 
equitable estoppel may be invoked to preclude 
a party to a contract from asserting the 
unenforceability of a contract by reason of 
the fact that it is not in writing as 
required by the statute of frauds. As is 
often said, the statute of frauds may be 
rendered inoperative by an estoppel in pais. 
Where one has acted to his detriment solely 
in reliance on an oral agreement, an estoppel 
may be raised to defeat the defense of the 
statute of frauds. This is based upon the 
principle established in equity, and applying 
in every transaction where the statute is 
invoked, that the statute of frauds, having 
been enacted for the purpose of preventing 
fraud, shall not be made the instrument of 
shielding, protecting, or aiding the party 
who relies upon it in the perpetration of a 
fraud or in the consummation of a fraudulent 
scheme. It is called into operation to 
defeat what would be an unconscionable use of 
the statute, and guards against the 
utilization of the statute as means for 
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defrauding innocent persons who have been 
induced or permitted to change their position in 
reliance upon oral agreements within its 
operation. 
Id. 
In Christensen v. Christensen, 339 P.2d 101 (Utah 
1959), the court granted specific performance on the 
ground that the terms of the contract were proved with 
sufficient certainty by competent testimony. The court 
reached this conclusion in spite of the fact that the 
court did not even refer to estoppel and simply phrased 
the opinion in terms of the contract being "taken out" 
of the statute of frauds by reason of ample part 
performance by the plaintiff. 
The court in, Evershed v. Berry, 436 P.2d 438 
(Utah 1968), cited Utah Savings and Loan Association v. 
Mecham, 366 P.2d 598 (Utah 1961), which sets forth the 
requirements to establish estoppel against a mortgagee: 
"in order to establish an estoppel against a mortgagee, 
the lien claimant must show some concealment, 
misrepresentation, act or declaration of the mortgagee 
upon which the lien holder properly relied and by which 
he was induced to act differently than he would 
otherwise have acted." 
Both the plaintiff and Ogden Dewitt testified at 
trial regarding the terms of the contract. Both 
parties agreed that the $1,000 check and the $617 check 
-18-
were in accordance with the terms of the agreement for 
the cure of the default as set by Mr. Grossen. The 
acts done in performance of the contract were clear and 
definite, and they were done in reliance on the 
contract. The DeWitts would not have paid money to 
fulfill their part of the agreement in reliance on the 
plaintiff's terms for the cure had there not been an 
agreement. Persons in the defendants' position would 
not have paid money on a property that was going to be 
foreclosed unless they believed they had an agreement 
to cure the default. 
There are many other cases which also support the 
DeWitt's position. Carnesecca v. Carnesecca, 572 P.2d 
708 (Utah 1977), is one of them. One of the parties to 
the action asserted the statute of frauds as a defense 
to an oral contract involving real estate. The court 
found that there was "substantial evidence of a fully-
executed oral contract of purchase.'' The court noted 
that in reliance on one party's conduct, all other 
parties bound themselves to sell and thus gave up a 
substantial legal right. The court stated: 
These facts clearly meet the test of 
equitable estoppel set forth in Koch v. J.C. 
Penney Co., [534 P.2d 903 (Utah 1975),] which 
is: conduct by one party which leads another 
party, in reliance thereon, to adopt a course 
of action resulting in detriment or damage if 
the first party is permitted to repudiate his 
-19-
conduct. 
Id. The facts of the case at bar also clearly meet the 
test of equitable estoppel. 
Again in Romrell v. Zions First National Bank, 611 
P.2d 392 (Utah 1980), the court allowed the doctrine of 
part performance to estop the assertion of the statute 
of frauds: 
The jury was instructed that if they found an 
oral contract for the conveyance of the land 
in question, the contract could be enforced 
if there was sufficient part performance on 
the part of plaintiff or if defendants had 
acted in such a manner as to be estopped from 
asserting the statute of frauds. 
Id. 
In addition, the Utah Court of Appeals in, Green 
v. Stansfield, 886 P.2d 117 (Utah Ct. App. 1994), said: 
". . . under the equitable doctrine of part performance 
a court will sometimes apply estoppel to enforce an 
oral or implied agreement which has been partially or 
fully performed in reliance on the agreement." In 
another case, the court of appeals noted that estoppel 
is an exception to the general rule that extensions of 
a contract required to be in writing must comply with 
the statute of frauds to be enforceable. Mills v. 
Brody, 929 P.2d 360 (Utah Ct. App. 1996). 
Finally, a law review article, The Doctrine of 
Part Performance as Applied to Oral Land Contracts in 
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Utah, 9 Utah L. Rev. 106 (1964), states: "An admission 
by the defendant is, of course, the best parol proof" 
of the existence of an oral agreement which could then 
be enforced. The article concludes: 
Most jurisdictions do not have an express 
part performance clause in their Statute of 
Frauds, and thus, as a practical matter, it 
would be difficult for courts in those 
jurisdictions to formulate a highly-liberal 
part performance doctrine. However, the 
presence of an express part performance 
clause in Utah's Statute would seem to give 
legislative sanction to our court to adopt a 
more liberal doctrine which would exclude 
certain oral land contracts from the Statute, 
on the same basis that oral contracts for the 
sale of goods have been excluded. 
In the case at hand both the plaintiff and Ogden 
Dewitt testified at trial regarding the terms of the 
contract. While there was some disagreement regarding 
the timing for the payment of taxes and insurance, both 
parties agreed that the $1,000 check and the $617 check 
were in accordance with the terms of the agreement for 
the cure of the default as set by Mr. Grossen. The 
acts done in performance of the contract were clear and 
definite, and they were done in reliance on the 
contract. The DeWitts would not have paid money to 
fulfill their part of the agreement in reliance on the 
plaintiff's terms for the cure had there not been an 
agreement. Persons in the defendants' position would 
not have paid money on a property that was going to be 
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foreclosed unless they believed they had an agreement 
to cure the default. Allowing the plaintiff to prevail 
based upon the statute of frauds would work a fraud 
against the DeWitts who relied on the plaintiff's 
representations and performed according to the 
agreement. 
Earl Grossen has repeatedly admitted that an oral 
agreement was struck and that Ogden DeWitt's actions in 
paying the checks to the plaintiff were in accordance 
with that agreement. In Brinton v. Van Cott, 33 P.2d 
218 (Utah 1893), the court stated: "Crucially 
significant [to the estoppel analysis] was the fact 
that the existence of the contract had been admitted as 
true." 
In The Bowery Savings Bank v. Jenkins, 516 P.2d 
178 (Utah 1973), the Utah Supreme Court indicated tht a 
party could waive the right to foreclosure by telling a 
mortgagor that, "No action would be forthcoming if 
defendant paid the aggregate of the payments due." 
That is essentially what happened in this case. Mr. 
Grossen told Ogden DeWitt that making the back payments 
would prevent the foreclosure and Ogden DeWitt relied 
on that promise and made the payments as promised. 
Despite that, Mr. Grossen went forward with the 
foreclosure sale. The court in Jenkins referred to 
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these actions as "confidential double-talk . . . which 
an equity court may abhor, but which a Scroogian 
mortgagee might adore." The Utah Supreme court has 
also clearly stated that, "The principles of waiver and 
estoppel have application in determining the rights of 
parties to foreclosure sales." American Falls Canal 
Securities Co. v. American Savings and Loan, 775 P.2d 
412 (Utah 1989). 
Of all the cases that have been cited by the 
DeWitts holding that part performance and equitable 
estoppel are sufficient to take transactions like this 
out the statute of frauds, Woolsey v. Brown, 539 P.2d 
1035 (Utah 1975), is perhaps the most on point. In 
that case the court said: 
There is no serious dispute that the parties 
entered into an oral agreement, . . . there is a 
factual disagreement as to the precise terms 
concerning the down payment. The oral contract 
was sufficiently definite; there was merely a 
controversy concerning one of the terms of the 
agreement, and it was the responsibility of the 
trial court to determine which version was in fact 
correct. 
Even though the trial "court concluded as a matter of 
law that plaintiffs had failed to establish the 
material terms of an oral contract of sale," the 
supreme court reversed stating that, "the evidence 
clearly preponderates against such a finding." The 
-23-
court went on to conclude that the oral contract would 
be enforced even though there was some ambiguity as to 
certain material terms of the contract. In the case 
under consideration there is ambiguity as to the timing 
of payments on insurance and taxes but both parties 
agree that there was an agreement about the back 
payments. 
In this case, there is no dispute that a contract 
existed and that the terms of the contract were 
partially performed by the defendants. The defendants 
have shown that they were able to comply with the terms 
of the agreement. Therefore, in light of the DeWitts' 
performance the court should find that the plaintiff is 
estopped from claiming the statute of frauds as a 
defense and the directed verdict should be reversed 
because there is a reasonable basis in the evidence and 
law that supports a judgment in favor of the DeWitts. 
Management Comm. Of Graystone Pine Homeowners Assfn ex. 
rel. Owners of Condominiums v. Graystone Pines, Inc.. 
652 P.2d 896 (Utah 1982). The Court should not 
sustain the directed verdict because reasonable 
[people] could arrive at different conclusions. 
Anderson v. Gribble, 30 Utah 2d 68, 513 P.2d 432 
(1973). 
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THE FORECLOSURE SALE SHOULD BE SET ASIDE 
BECAUSE THE DEWITT'S TENDERED THE MONEY TO 
CURE THE DEFAULT 
Utah Code Ann. § 57-1-30(1) allows a trustor to 
cure a default by paying to the beneficiary the entire 
amount then due under the terms of the trust deed 
within three months of the filing of notice of default. 
This was accomplished in this case when Ogden DeWitt 
tendered the two checks that Mr. Grossen had 
represented would cure the default. Utah Code Ann. § 
57-1-31(1) also provides that once the default has been 
cured, "all proceedings theretofore had or instituted 
shall be dismissed or discontinued and the obligation 
and trust deed shall be reinstated and shall be and 
remain in force and effect the same as if no such 
acceleration had occurred." The Utah Court of Appeals 
has interpreted this section to mean that, "the parties 
are returned to their former status as if the default 
had never occurred. If a trustor subsequently defaults 
again the beneficiary must begin new foreclosure 
proceedings. It may not rely on the previous notice of 
default and declaration of acceleration." Progressive 
Acquisition, Inc., v. Lytle, 806 P.2d 239 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1991) . 
The foreclosure sale should be set aside in this 
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case because Ogden DeWitt cured the first default. He 
tendered the money that Mr. Grossen represented was 
required to cure the default, and Mr. Grossen accepted 
both checks without protest. These actions worked to 
cure the default. Any subsequent "default" that Mr. 
Grossen may had discovered after the checks were 
tendered required a new foreclosure proceeding. 
According to the relevant statutes and case law it was 
improper for Mr. Grossen to continue with the original 
proceeding after the cure; therefore, the foreclosure 
should be set aside. 
GROSSEN'S RELIANCE ON McKINNON IS MISPLACED 
Mr. Grossen at the trial level relied on McKinnon 
v. Corporation of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-
Day Saints, 529 P.2d 434 (Utah 1974), as primary 
authority for his position that estoppel and part 
performance do not apply in this case. Grossen's 
reliance on McKinnon is badly misplaced for four 
reasons. First of all, in that case "the defendant 
denied the existence of any agreement, written or oral 
1 . ." That case is in stark contrast to the case at 
hand wherein Mr. Grossen has admitted many times that a 
contract or an agreement was reached. 
Second, in McKinnon even the plaintiff's counsel 
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conceded that the basic terms of the agreement were not 
to be determined until some future date, and in fact 
plaintiff's counsel "never proposed specific terms." 
Once again this is in stark contrast to the case at 
hand wherein both parties have recited exactly what the 
specific terms of the agreement were, subject only to 
dispute as to when the taxes and insurance had to be 
paid. 
Third, in McKinnon the party claiming part 
performance stated in his deposition that, "these 
checks were a cash donation" to the church and, 
therefore, the court could easily find that the part 
performance was not "exclusively referable" to the 
agreement, as required by Utah law. Once again that is 
in stark contrast to this case wherein Ogden DeWitt 
paid Mr. Grossen in excess of $1,600 solely because of 
the agreement that was reached. There was only one 
reason Ogden DeWitt paid Mr. Grossen the two checks: 
that was because they had reached an agreement for the 
cure of the default. 
Fourth, as Justice Crockett noted in his 
concurrence, "the plaintiff could show no damage 
because he sold his property without any lessening of 
the price due to lack of the easement." That is not 
the same as this case wherein the DeWitts have 
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significant damage because they have been ousted from 
their home, not to mention the trauma caused by 
uprooting a family. Therefore, the DeWitts believe 
McKinnon is not controlling in this case and, in fact, 
highlights the very points that make estoppel and part 
performance very applicable to the case at bar. The 
DeWitts are aware of no Utah case wherein both parties 
have admitted the contract existed, admitted the terms 
of the contract, admitted part performance of the 
contract, only to have the court then defeat the 
contract on the basis of statute of frauds. In fact 
just the opposite occurs. "The foremost element is 
clear and convincing proof of the terms of the oral 
agreement. An admission by the defendant is, of 
course, the best proof (The Doctrine of Part 
Performance, L. Rev. 106.) 
POINT IIII 
THE UTAH SUPREME COURT HAS "RECOGNIZED THE 
FULL EFFECTIVENESS OF LIS PENDENS PENDING 
APPEAL" 
In Hidden Meadows Development Company v. Mills, 
590 P.2d 1244 (Utah 1979), the Utah Supreme Court 
stated that the fact that the lis pendens statute, Utah 
Code Ann., § 78-40-2, "allows the recordation of a Lis 
Pendens at any time clearly preserves its integrity 
-28-
after judgment and pending appeal." The court went on 
to note, "this court has long ago recognized the on-
going potency and effectiveness of a recorded lis 
pendens after judgment." Id. Finally the court stated 
that, "the Court has already recognized the full 
effectiveness of lis pendens pending appeal." Id. See 
also California-Hawaii Development, Inc. v. Superior 
Court, 162 Cal. Rptr. 365 (Ct. App. 1980). This case 
clearly establishes that the lis pendens should not 
have been released by the trial judge and should be 
reinstated by this court. 
CONCLUSION 
Because this is a directed verdict, the evidence 
must be examined in the light most favorable to the 
losing party, and if there is a reasonable basis in the 
evidence and in the inferences to be drawn therefrom 
that would support a judgment in favor of the losing 
party, the directed verdict cannot be sustained. 
Management Comm. Of Graystone Pine Homeowners Assfn ex. 
rel. Owners of Condominiums v. Graystone Pines, Inc.. 
652 P.2d 896 (Utah 1982). Furthermore, it is 
appropriate for the appellate court to sustain the 
granting of a motion for a directed verdict only if the 
evidence was such that reasonable [people] could not 
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arrive at a different conclusion. Anderson v. Gribble, 
513 P.2d 432 (1973). In light of this standard of 
review the DeWitts respectfully request this court to 
reverse the previously directed verdict for two 
reasons. First, a cure of a default need not be 
memorialized in writing to be enforceable. A cure can 
be accomplished by performance or other resolution of 
the matters constituting the default. Second, the 
directed verdict should be reversed because the 
plaintiff admitted there was a "deal" and the DeWitts 
performed at least part of that deal. Therefore, the 
doctrines of estoppel and part performance take this 
case outside the strict application of the statute of 
frauds. Lastly, the DeWitts ask the Court to set aside 
the foreclosure sale and to strike the portion of the 
findings declaring the lis pendens released. The lis 
pendens should remain valid until this case is finally 
resolved. 
DATED this ? day of (Xy^g- 1998. 
DUVAL HJttJSEN WITT & MORLEY, P.C. 
(^ GpftUbN W. DUVAL^ // 
Attorney for Appellants 
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1 Q And on that occasion, could you explain what 
2 happened, how the default was cured or -
3 A The details of this are in these papers. 
4 Q Okay. 
5 A And there's a promissory note there signed 
6 by Afton Dewitt and Derrick Dewitt and I think it's 
7 dated November -- the 12th day of December, 1992. There 
8 may be one later than that. Yeah, there's one later, 
9 June 1993, the 1st of June, 1993, and that's signed by 
10 both parties. 
11 Q Do you mind if Ms. Petersen takes a look at 
12 these documents? And by any chance, did you bring any 
13 checks with you? 
14 A I destroyed them. They weren't any good to 
15 me because he had lied to me. 
16 Q When did you destroy those checks? 
17 A And misled me. After I got through telling 
18 him on the phone that the deal was off -
19 Q Do you know -
20 A — for chicanery. 
21 Q Do you know what date that was? 
22 A Probably March or April of this year. 
23 Something like that. I can't recall. 
24 Q And when you say that the deal was off, what 
25 are you referring to0 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
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19 
20 
21 
22 
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24 
25 
Page 15 
Q Are you referring to Kevin Dewitt? 
A Or Kevin, yeah. Derrick had it first and 
then Kevin. 
Q Okay. Let's go back to the checks that 
you're referring to. You said that you received a check 
for SI,000? 
A As I recall it was about a thousand. 
Q Do you recall the date that you received 
that check? 
A I think it was February. Somewhere around 
in there, February or March. 
Q So you think that would have been at the end 
of February, or at the beginning of February? 
A It seems like it was towards the end of 
February. I tore the checks up and threw them away. 
They were no good to me. 
Q Did you receive that — did you receive that 
check or any checks prior to the trustee's sale? 
A Yes. 
Q Do you recall the date of the trustee's 
sale? 
A I think it was April 1996. I think we have 
that date. And it was advertised and Dewitts were aware 
of it. And incidentally, they didn't show up for the 
sale. 
Page 14j 
1 A I told him that there was no deal, that I 
2 wasn't going to take the checks and cash them. And I 
3 didn't, 1 didn't cash any of them. 
4 Q Is the deal referring to his having tendered 
5 those checks to you — 
6 i\ A The deal was that the back taxes weren't 
7 paid as they should have been, according to the 
JjA contract, and the house had been put under a lien of 
9 '22,000, which I was very irate about, and the property 
I (4) had been transferred to Mr. Ogden Dewitt without my 
II knowledge, without my information,. My attorney had to 
12 do research on that. David Crabtree, and he has the 
13 David Crabtree file. Mr. Cline. And I was very irate, 
14 to put it mildly, about what was going on so I told him 
15 the deal was off, and he knows that. 
16 Q And, again, do you have an approximate date 
17 that would have been0 
18 A That he gave me the last check, I think it 
19 was in April or March of this year. 
20 Q When you say last check, that's referring 
21 t o -
22 A He gave me one I think for 1,000 and another 
23 one for 1,600 and something. And those were the back 
24 payments of Derrick Dewitt's rent payments or house 
25 payments that weren't paid. 
Page 1 
1 Q Who did show up for the sale? 
2 A Mr. Crabtree, my attorney at the time. 
3 Q So Mr. Crabtree was the attorney that 
4 conducted the sale? 
5 A David Crabtree, right. And there's a copy 
6 of the sale. 
7 Q Do you know who Scott Ryther is? 
8 A I don't have a clue. 
9 Q Okay. So you destroyed the checks that you 
10 received; is that true0 
11 A And I told you why. 
12 Q Do you know how Mr. Ogden Dewitt arrived at 
13 the figures that the checks were written out for? 
14 A As I recall, he came to those totals that 
15 the checks were written for to make up for back payments 
16 that had not been paid on the property. And there were 
17 a whole bunch of payments since then that weren't made. 
18 Q Did it include any other fees or charges? 
19 A Not that I can recall. I don't think it 
20 did. And if it did, it wasn't made clear. 
21 Q And so you stated earlier that as of 
22 December, you believe that it was seven or eight months 
23 in arrearage, the property? 
24 A I don't remember exactly how many months, I 
25 would have to go back and calculate. I don't know 
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exactly how many months, but apparently it was in 
arrears to the tune of about 2,600, because that's wha4 
he paid me. 
Q How did you receive the first check, was it 
by mail or — 
A The very first check? 
Q Yes. Was it in person, was it — 
(\ I think he dropped it off in person. 
Q To your home? 
A Uh-huh (affirmative). 
Q How did you receive the second check? 
\ I think he put it in my mailbox. 
Q Do you I'm sony , w ith 11 children I 
don't know that I caught every name on there. Do % ou 
have a son named Alan? 
A Never heard of him. 
No son-in-law or 
A Never heard of him. Don't know him. 
Q Okay. Let's see. Why did you accept that 
first check from him in person when he dropped it i-fP 
\ Because I thought everything had been taken 
care of and I had been led to believe that and I was it 
that time willing to go along with his proposal. And 
then I found out all these other things that made me 
very upset and irate, to say the least. 
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(j When you say everything was taken care oi 
his proposal, you're referring to the deal that you 
referred to earlier'1 
A The word-of-mouth deal, the deal we 
discussed on the phone. 
Q Okay. And that was regarding the cure of 
the default on the property? 
A Uh-huh (affirmative). And as 1 recall, 
those amounts were for payments that they hadn't made 
and late payments. 
Q So you had discussed amounts that — in 
coming up with this deal, you had discussed amounts that 
— 'MHia: need to produce or gwr to >ou. tender to you? 
A A- i recall. \eah, thai N what we talked 
anou: 
V v. Mie amounts oi" the checks that ne nad 
giver \ou v*ere in the amounts that \ou had agreed upon 
*n this deal^ 
A Yeah u. time. 
Q Oka\ 
A But tnat was before I knew the facts of the 
matter. 
Q Do you know when the property was posted 
with the notice of sale? 
A I think Mr. Cline has 'that information and 
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the advertisements. It was advertised for three \ . 
THF WITNESS: Do you remember when the in:>t 
, *ne 
VK CLINE: If you don't know the answer, 
h i \ spot -late, just say I don't know. 
MR. GUZMAN: Okay. 
THE WITNESS: I don't MH-W 
MR. GUZMAN: And do you ha\e J i'ii[i\ Il III 
t,v! ' i' H*M have one, 
MR. CLINE: We can produce those for you 
MR. GUZMAN; Okay, great, thanks, I 
•ipprcciate that. 
• H \lf Guzman) Who prepared the notice of 
> MI crabtree. 
,) Okay. And wh .H , , 
v Mr. Crabtree. 
[ >• . ou know how it was done'? 
A It was advertised in the newspaper for three 
weeks, from what he told me. 
Q And at the home, d<• \, . l •< 
lon't have a clue 
Q Okay. V\rhen did you purchase this prope: 
*•
 :
 ason? 
\ I think about 1981. 
P.-v^ e ^° 
. ).• . uu recall how much you paid for the 
property' 
A No, I don't. 
Q Would you be able to find that out? 
. would like to speak to my attorney about 
that one 
Q Okay. And we will be taking a break, if you 
A/ant to wait. 
MR. CLrNE: Let's just ~ he doesn't recall 
MOW much he paid for it. If you wan: u> make a written 
request, then we can object to that. I don't believe 
that's relevant, but I believe that issue has been 
handled. 
MR. GUZMAN: Okay. 
Q (By Mr. Guzman) Do you know what the 
property is valued at now? 
A It was appraised for 90,000. 
, i")< MM have a eopv of that appraisal with 
A I do not have it with me. 
Q Would we be able to get a t np\ m il'uii 
appraisal? 
vould have to visit with my attorney about 
IV !R. CI INE: Again, you coi; 
•:: .ten 
. ane 17 - Pa- • :0 
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1 where you have actually taken out a second mortgage on 
2 your property, have you ever requested from a first 
3 mortgage holder, someone who was first in line on your I 
4 property, for permission to take out that second 
5 mortgage? 
6 A I don't recall any situation where I needed 
7 to do that. 
8 Q Could I ask then why you felt that it needed 
9 to be done in this case? 
, 10 A Why I objected to the second mortgage? 
11 Q Why would you ~ why would you state that 
12 one of the reasons for your objection of your — one of 
13 the reasons that you did not want to go through with the 
14 deal that you had with Mr. Dewitt was because he had 
15 taken out a second mortgage on the home? 
16 A I didn't want any encumbrances on the 
17 property because I was in first position and it would 
18 mean that if someone were in second position they would 
19 probably bid against me on the property or I would have 
20 to buy them out, which was suggested on several 
21 occasions by Transamerica. Now why they didn't show for 
22 the sale, I don't know. But they suggested on more than 
23 one occasion to me that they buy me out, my first 
24 position. That's why. 
25 Q You stated earlier that you had received and 
1 Page 26 
i accepted late payments before from the Dewitts on this 
2 trust deed note; is that correct? 
3 A Yeah, on several occasions. More often than 
4 not. ! 
5 Q How did you handle those late payments? Did 
6 you contact them and tell them that they were late ~ 
A If they had a phone where they could be 
s found or if they would answer the door, which in a lot 
9 of cases they were unavailable for comment, I had to 
io track them down. 
ii Q How did they -
i - A Or go out to Pason to find them, and they 
13 would never answer the door. 
14
 Q How did they tender the payments to you 
15 generally? 
1 n
 A Most of the time by check. 
1
 Q Was that by mail, or did they personally 
h*> bring it by? 
1 g
 \ I would say in a number of cases they would 
\2u deliver the payment to my house or I would meet them 
p i haltway between Pason and Orem, in Springville. 
h - Q When you say house, you're talking about 
|23 your Orem home? 
J24 A That's correct. 
I2 5 Q Were you present at the trustee's sale? 
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1 A No. 
2 Q And at what point in time did you decide to 
3 proceed with the trust sale? WTien I say what point it 
4 time, I realize we're talking about from December on, 
5 December 1995, January 1996, et cetera. 
6 A Well, I had talked about it on several 
7 occasions with Mr. Buckley. I had located in Salt 
8 Lake — relocated in Salt Lake and I was desirous of 
9 changing the attorney because I was living in Salt 
10 Lake. I knew Mr. Crabtree and I talked to him about il 
11 and I think we proceeded on it in short matter after -
12 time after I talked with him about not accepting his 
13 checks and that the deal was off. 
14 Q Could you give me an approximate time frame 
15 there? 
16 A I think it was in the first part of March, 
17 somewhere along in there. 
18 Q Did you discuss this trustee's sale with any 
19 of your children or family members? 
20 A I don't remember. 
21 Q Any other person besides your attorney? 
22 A I don't think so. 
23 Q And I think we clarified that Mr. Crabtree 
24 was your attorney up until the time of the sale, is that 
25 correct, from December or January 19 - let's say 
Page 2! 
1 January 1996 through the time of the sale; is that 
2 correct? 
3 A Approximately. And then he had some other 
4 affairs to take care of in Washington, D C , some 
5 weightier matters, and suggested that Mr. Wilkey 
6 takeover for him in the law office, Kimball, Parr. 
7 Mr. Wilkey moved to Arizona, so he's no longer handling 
8 it. 
9 Q Did your attorney, Mr. Crabtree, did he 
10 notify you of any phone calls that were received by him 
11 from Ogden Dewitt? 
12 A Yeah, he told me that Mr. Dewitt had called 
13 and wanted to redeem the property somehow. And I told 
14 him it was impossible. I've pursued this whole story 
15 line for, I don't know how long, and I told him the deal 
16 was off and I told him why. 
17 Q And this was prior to the sale, the 
18 trustee's sale? 
19 A That I told Mr. Dewitt that the sale was 
20 off - the redemption was off? 
21 Q I'm sorry. I wasn't being very clear and I 
22 apologize for that. My question is did your attorney, 
23 Mr. Crabtree, notify you of any phone calls from 
24 Mr. Dewitt prior to the trustee's sale? 
25 A Yeah, I think so. I think there was at 
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least a couple of times. Mr, Dewitt wanted to reclaim 
ne property and I told Mr. Crabtree it was out of the 
_, 4Ucstion. I told Mr. Dewitt that in English. 
4 MR. GUZMAN: Ms. Petersen, do you h a w .inv 
5 questions at this time? 
6 MS. PETERSEN: I do. Thanks . 
7 EXAMINATION BY j 
8 MS. PETERSEN: 
9 Q Just for clarification, because we've talked j 
10 about several things and I don't think we've fleshed outj 
11 some details here, so if you feel like I 'm repeating I j 
12 apologize, but I would just like to have things as clear 
13 as possible. When we asked you about your address at 
14 the beginning of the deposition, you gave it as a Salt 
15 Lake City address. It's my understanding that at the 
- time these events took place you lived in Orem; is *hat 
correct 
. > .A At the time what events took place? 
19 Q At the time the foreclosures began, flic 
20 notice of sale and the negotiations with Mr. Dewitt took 
place. 
.;: \ 1 was basically semi-living in Salt Lake at 
: * the time the foreclosures were going on. as I recall. 
Q When did vou move to Salt Lake ' M a \ \ mat 
vx ill i\Ci\ 
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1 . Do ihcy . w :i ine area? 
Q Do they live in the area? 
3 ..ne three that live in the area. 
4 v And did they ever visa you when you lived 
j . n the < u-em home? 
6 A Periodically. 
7 Q Could any of them have been vi.Mtimj on 
8 approximately February 5th of 1996? 
9 A I have no idea. I doubt it. 
10 g v\ here do they live in the area? Do they 
r in town, do they live out of the way ~ 
12 A I have three sons that live in Salt Lake. 
13 Q Thank you. At the time you lived in the 
-i Orem home there was still only this young son James that 
could have been at the home to be answering the 
telephone? 
\ As far as I know; 
. is Q Okay. We discussed a little bit about the 
; *• agreement that you had with Mr. Dewitt and you --
2i A The verbal agreement? 
Q -\nu vou began to talk about the verbal 
^ agj-^ment and I kind of got sidetracked. I would just 
2/ like to have you explain to us what your understanding 
« of the verbal agreement was at the time you made the 
25 agreement. Notwithstanding what you think you found out 
\pproximatei\ -- 1 started mo• M.: 
A 
s;iu wAcn CAC you finish movmj ' 
1 iu i \en ' ! 
K
. nu ha\e not yet? 
I ' \e lived :n the house for 25 years and I 
im still moving out of it. 
Q When did you have yoi lr phone disconnected at 
i lie ()rem address'? 
A About three weeks ago. 
Q Thank you. You mentioned some children that 
may or may not have been around at the home to answer 
the phone. 
A Which home? 
Q In Salt Lake. Could you tell nu 
A There's only one there and his name is 
James. 
Q I understand that. 
A And he's still a child. 
Q How old is he0 
A He's about 17. 
Q Do you have sons and daughters-I 
visit you? 
A Very seldom. 
Q Do they live in the area? 
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later, what was your agreement that you made with him 
over the phone? 
A When I got his phone call, he suggested that 
he takeover, as I recall, the payments that were due and 
pay it up. And he didn't have enough money at the time 
to pay it all up and he wanted some extra time, he 
wanted two weeks extra. He said he would give me a 
thousand down and he would hand deliver it, as I recall, 
and try and make amends for what had been done and make 
up for the defaults and the problems that had occurred. 
And then I think right after I got that check I found 
out through Mr. Crabtree, and other sources, that the 
property had been mortgaged without my permission and 
taxes had not been paid as they had said they were ant1 
there was no fire insurance and the quit claim deed had 
already transferred the property to him without my 
knowledge. 
Q You did agree to accept the S1,00U 
A Except I didn't know what had transpired and 
1 did not cash that check. 
Q I understand that. 
MS. PETERSEN: could you just instruct him 
•iswer the question? 
rHE WITNESS: I agreed verbally. 
MR cuNEt At this time did your 
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understanding of this agreement include anything else? 
Did it include something with respect to the taxes, the 
insurance? 
THE WITNESS: As I recall, the taxes had not 
been paid, the fire insurance had not been obtained, and 
I forget the details of that, but I recall that I was 
very irritated that there was two years of back taxes 
due and there was no fire insurance on the property. If 
it burned down, I would be left holding the bag. 
Q (By Ms. Petersen) Mr. Grossen, my question 
is when you made the verbal agreement, did you discuss 
back taxes at that time with Mr. Dewitt? 
A I don't remember. 
Q Okay. Your first testimony was that you 
didn't know about the back taxes at the time of the 
agreement and that it was a surprise after the 
agreement. Is it my understanding now that your 
testimony is that you don't remember at the time you 
made the conversation whether or not you discussed the 
back taxes? 
A Well, it seems like I had been aware that 
those back taxes hadn't been paid before I talked to 
him, but I think we - we did talk about it, but I'm not 
real sure. 
Q Okay, thank you. 
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1 verbal agreement? 
2 A Yes, I believe he was. 
3 Q Did you speak with Mr. Crabtree about that 
4 conversation and inform him that you had made an 
5 agreement of some sort? 
6 A I told him that I had made a verbal 
7 agreement with Mr. Dewitt and the deal was off and I was 
8 not going to cash the checks. 
9 Q Did you ever contact Mr. Dewitt prior to the 
10 notice of sale being posted to inform him of that? 
11 A I didn't, but he called my attorney about 
12 it. 
13 Q Let me just make sure I'm clear. Your 
14 instructions -- you had a telephone conversation with 
15 Mr. Dewitt, you made a verbal agreement, at what 
16 point - how many days, hours, weeks after you made that 
17 verbal agreement did you decide that the deal was off? 
18 A I think within a couple of days. Soon 
19 enough that I didn't cash the check. 
20 Q So you called Mr. Crabtree. Did you call 
21 him first and tell him that you had made an agreement? 
22 A No, I think Mr. Dewitt called him and then 
23 Mr. Crabtree called me, as I recall, back. I can't 
24 remember for sure. 
25 Q Okay. So you never told Mr. Crabtree — 
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A I'm going by memory. 
Q Thank you, that's all I had on that. 
A And it's been a long time ago. 
Q The next question I have is you testified 
that you were surprised by the Transamerica lien. I 
would like to ask you to the best of your recollection 
did you know about the Transamerica lien when you spoke 
with Mr. Dewitt over the phone and made the agreement? 
A I don't think I did. 
Q Thank you. When did you find out, to the 
best of your recollection, about the Transamerica lien? 
A As I recall it was in March when they called 
me. 
Q Okay. And when was the notice of sale 
again0 
A It was in March, I think. 
Q Thank you. 
A I don't remember the exact date. 
Q After you spoke with Mr. Dewitt on the 
phone, did you have contact with Mr. Crabtree, who I 
understand was your attorney at the time; is that 
correct? 
A Say again. 
Q Was Mr. Crabtree your attorney at the time 
25
 thatyou spoke with Mr. Dewitt on the phone and made the 
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1 what check are you referring to about? 
2 A The first check he gave me for a thousand. 
3 As I recall, that was the amount. 
4 Q And just so I'm clear on the time line, 
5 approximately what day did you speak to him on the phone 
6 and make the agreement? 
7 A It seems like it was the first part of 
8 February. 
9 Q And how soon after that conversation did he 
10 bring you the check? 
11 A The second check? 
12 Q The first check, the SI,000 that he promised 
13 on the phone. 
14 A I think it was within 24 hours. I don't 
15 recall for sure. 
16 Q So you think it was within 24 hours and you 
17 hadn't -
18 A Of the conversation? 
19 Q Yes. 
20 A It seems like it was. It seems like he was 
21 rather anxious to pay me the thousand. And I think he 
22 hand delivered it, as I said. 
23 Q And you had not contacted Mr. Crabtree at 
24 the time that you accepted the first $1,000 check? 
25 A That I don't recall. 
(801) 363-7939 Page 33 - Page 
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' 1 Q How long after that phone conversation did 
/ou accept the second check for $617? 
^ For how much? 
4 \) f> 1", if m\ recollection is correct. 
5 \ ! thought it was 1,600, but it could haw 
6 been 600. I think it was about two weeks later, (• \ 
7 days later that he got the second check to me. 
8 Q And you had already spoken ~ had you 
9 already spoken to Mr. Crabtree and said the deal was off 
-•. then'7 
! \ Yes. Yes. 
fj And why uui M- ; •-• ' 
A Y\ hy did I accept it? I wasn't there to 
." receive it. He put it in my mailbox. 
Q Had he delivered checks that way before? 
\ ! Jidn't get it in person. Pardon? 
Q Had he delivered checked to you before? 
19 A Had he delivered them? 
20 Q Had there been checks delivered that way to 
\ou before through the mailbox slot? 
A I believe I said that some of the checks had 
..,} been delivered by Kevin Dewitt by way of my mailbox 
I-* without postage on them. 
Is Q Had you spoken to Mr. Dewitt prior to the 
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vcond check being delivered and let him know that the 
.. deal was off? 
3 A No, I don' t believe 1 did. 
4 Q So when he delivered the second check he was 
5 still not informed that you had changed your mind? 
6 MR. CLIXE: Objection I don't want you 
7 speculating as to what he knew or didn't know at that 
8 time 
9 Q (By Ms. Petersen) As far as \i-
io Mr. Grossen, did he know'' 
l A To tell you the truth. I realK den * rcca.. 
; 2 whether I talked to him — 
4 \ ••- prior ID that second check arriving. 
Q Okay, thank you 
MS. PETERSEN. I believe that's all the 
questions I have at this time. 
MR. Gl'ZMAX: I have one more. 
FI :RTHER EXAMINATION 
.:• •":••• M R . G U Z M A N : 
Q Regarding the S1,000 check that was 
-l„ delivered in person, at that time when you accepted that 
23 check, was it your intent - am I to understand it was 
24 your intent at that point in time to honor the agreement 
25 that you had with Mr. Dewitt and then subsequent to that 
Page 3( 
i \ou found -- you ukwovcrcu iiuug> that you — that were 
: disturbing to you and then that's when you decided that 
3 you did not want to go through with the deal, as you 
4 testified earlier? 
5 A Well, as I said, it was never a written 
b agreement, it was a verbal agreement. He gave me a 
" check for 51,000, and as I recall he agreed to make the 
8 payments current which were in default and to pay the 
9 late payments which were due on those defaulted 
10 payments. 
1 Q I understand that. 
1
. A What's your question? 
Q My question is was it your intent at the 
• time that you received the check in person from -- th* 
$1,000 from Mr. Dewitt, to honor the agreement, the :c:. 
•~ that you referred to earlier? 
i * A 1 think that there was a verbal agreement to 
, ^ AV cept his check at the time. 
Q My question was, was it your intent to honor 
. i the agreement when you accepted that check? 
21 A I just said I think there was a verbal 
22 agreement --
Q The $1,000-
2- A - to allow that check to r> »•• ' e 
25 payment for the back payments. 
19 
20 
21 
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Q And I understand that, but my question goes 
to your intent and — 
MR. CLiNE: whatever the agreement was, did 
you intend to honor the agreement at the time that you 
entered into it? Was it your intent ~ 
Q (By Mr. Guzman) At the time that you 
accepted the 51,000-
MR. CLINE: -- on the phone -
THE WITNESS: To tell you the truth, 1 was 
really skeptical, as I think back on it, because he came 
in a flash with the check and was gone in a flash and 
there was really never any long conversation about any 
lengthy agreement, verbal or otherwise. And I just 
recall he was short money and he couldn' t pay the rest 
of the money and he wanted me to wait, I agreed to 
wait. So I suspect there was some intent there because 
I took his check, but I didn't eu>n it necause of what I 
learned after the fact. 
Q (By Mr. Guzman, ^ me astc you, would you 
think it unusual if you had -- >ou were Mr. Ogden 
Dewitt, not Kevin, but :: Mr Ogden Dewittfs situation, 
where someone in your family was going to lose their 
home, if you had made an agreement to cure the default, 
would you think that - would you think that out of the 
ordinary that the person would come quickly to the - to I 
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you and pay that money? 
A Would I think in the same way? I don't 
know, I've never been in that circumstance. 
Q You just said that you thought that it was 
funny that he came in a flash, but do you now think this 
was a situation that called for the quickest of actions 
on Mr. Dewitt's -
A I've never been in that circumstances, I 
don't know what I would do. 
Q So you don't know that you would pay it that 
quickly? 
A I think it would depend on the 
circumstances. 
Q And I understand from your testimony, then, 
that you did have an intent to honor this agreement when 
you accepted that S 1,000 check from Mr. Ogden Dewitt? 
A First of ail, I didn't cash the check and -
Q I understand. You said accepted ~ 
A There was some kind of an agreement 
obviously because I accepted the check. 
Q My question was accepted -
A But I didn't cash it. 
MR. CLINE: That's asked and answered. He's 
answered that. 
MR. GUZMAN': Do you have any more 
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questions? 
MS. PETERSEN: Not at this time. 
MR. GUZMAN: Perhaps we could take a break. 
MR. CLINE: I have some. 
MR. GUZMAN: Would you like to ask him some 
questions? I 'm sorry, go ahead. 
EXAMINATION 
BY MR. CLINE. 
Q Let me go through some questions that I have 
for you and then we'll go ahead and take our break. In 
order to refresh your recollection, this is a copy of 
the trustee deed that was recorded with the County. Can 
you read here the date that the trustee's sale was held? 
A February 29th. 
Q Right. 
A Okay. 
Q Does that refresh your recollection as to 
when the trustee's sale was held? 
A Yes, seeing it in print. 
Q Yes. 
A This was a chaotic time because I was in the 
process of getting remarried and trying to get my house 
cleared out. I couldn't remember all of the dates. 
Q The conversations that you've talked about, 
then, would those have taken place before October - or 
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before February 29th? 
A Yes. 
Q And you had said that you couldn't recall, 
perhaps March or April, so it wouldn't have been March 
or April, it would have been before February 29th? 
A Uh-huh (affirmative). Yes, that is correct. 
Q I'm going to also refresh your recollection 
by asking you to ~ this is the Notice of Default that's 
filed with the Utah County Recorder's Office on the 
property. The three items of default that are listed 
there, if I could just have you read those three items 
as to why the Notice of Default was filed. 
A Principal and interest in the amount of 
1,132 as of September 12th, 1995, taxes and assessments 
levied on the property, accounts necessary to maintain 
adequate fire insurance and improvements on the trust 
property. And this was -
Q What's the date on that? 
A 19th day of September, 1995. 
Q To the best of your knowledge, were the 
property taxes ever brought current prior to the 
trustee's sale? 
A No, they weren't because I paid them, two 
years. 
Q To the best of your knowledge, was the 
Page 44 
insurance ever placed in effect prior to the trustee's 
sale? 
A I only remember one time when they had 
insurance on that house for sure. And to my knowledge 
there was no other insurance. 
Q Between the time that this was signed, 
September 19th, 1996, and the date of the trustee's 
sale — 
A There was no insurance. 
Q ~ to the best of your knowledge - okay. 
And I'm going to show you, to refresh your recollection. 
trust deed that's recorded with the Utah County 
Recorder's Office, I don't - it 's paragraph 11. I 
don't know if you are able to read that. It's - if you 
can't, I will read it for you and you can confirm what 
I've read. Read that out loud, if you would. 
A Should trustor sale, convey, transfer or 
dispose or further encumber said property or any part 
thereof without the written consent of the beneficiary 
being first had and obtained, then beneficiary shall 
have the right at the option to declare all sums thereby 
forthwith due and payable. 
Q To the best of your knowledge did, in fact, 
1 the Dewitts encumber the property without your written 
^consent? 
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mailbox before? 
K I donft recall. I know Kevin Dewitt had and 
his wife had, his former wife or whoever she was. I 
don't recall. 
MR. CLINE: No further questions. 
FURTHER EXAMINATION 
BY MR. 01 JZMAN: 
Q While Ms. Petersen is looking at the trust 
deed note, just going back to the last question, when 
j
 IC - when your attorney asked if you believed that 
Mr. Ogden Dewitt received fair notice that the deal was 
off what would you consider fair notice to be? 
\ Now wait a minute. Repeat that. 
\ iii were just asked if you felt that 
Mr. Ogden Dewitt had received fair notice that the deal 
16 was off — 
, 7 ' T H E WITNESS: No, I thought you were talking 
18 about the trustee's sale, the sheriff's sale. I thought 
19 that's what you were talking about. 
MR. GUZMAN: I'm sorry, what w as you i 
question? 
FHE WITNESS: Isn't that what we were 
talking about? 
MR. GUZMAN: Perhaps I misunderstood it. 
MR. CLINE: whatever the agreement was that 
Taken November 12, 1996 
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} ill, GUZMAN; Back on the record. 
Q (By Mr. Guzman) Mr. Grossen, regarding the 
quit claim that you referred to as in violation of the 
contract, do you know from whom • ^ r ,>m a K »h-
^ ^  i recall -- Dave Crab tree told me about 
it and as I recall, like I said, it was after I got his 
•N S1,000 check from the verbal agreement, it was from 
* Afton to Ogden. 
\ ,; you sure about -
11 ITiat's my recollection. 
12 Are you sure about that? 
^ I'm not real sure. It could have been Kevin 
= i^w\ \ i know is I was upset at the time because 
15 the property had been transferred without my consent and 
16 in violation of the contract. 
: ' MR. GUZMAN: D o y o u h . i U ' i i n p \ nl IJ it i.|un 
\>> a a i : : . . 
19 MR CLINE: I d o n ' t , 
20 MR. GUZMAN: I'm sorry, I don't. 
21 Q (By Mr. Guzman) It's my understanding that 
22 the quit claim is from Afton to Kevin. Afton and Kevin, 
23 were they both the parties to the contract? 
24 A They signed the promissory - or the --
25 Q I'm sorry, the deed -- the trust -
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you had with - when you called — 
THE WITNESS: The verbal agreement -
MR. CLINE: You had the $1,000 check -
THE WITNESS: what about the agreement? 
MR. CLINE: You tore up the check and the 
question is did, in your opinion, did Ogden Dewitt, 
ifter you tore up that check and said we're going to go 
ihead with the notice of the trustee's sale and hold the 
trustee's sale, did Ogden Dewitt have fair notice that 
the trustee's sale was going forward? 
THE WITNESS: Oh, I'm sure he did. Yeah, he 
called my attorney, David Crabtree. 
Q (By Mr. Guzman) And my question then to you 
would be what would you consider fair notice to be, one 
day, two days, two weeks, one month'7 
A Any and all of the above. 
MR. GUZMAN. Do you have any questions for 
him? 
MS. PETERSEN: Not r i g h t now,,, 
MR. GUZMAN. Then perhaps it would be a good 
! l n i c [o take a break. I would like to discuss a few 
things with my client. 
MR. CLINE: okay, let's go off the record, 
(Off-the-record discussion.) 
__ (A brief recess.) 
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i i he 'rust deed. yes. 
2 <^ Are :he\ the only persons named on that 
1
 'rust deed ' 
- A Yes. Ogden i ^v- to >.nnx ivu t^  
picture until recently. 
So ._: \rton j u : claimed her interest in :he 
pro pert \ to Keun, she would still be hanle under the 
s trust deed note'* 
9 A She is liable because she signed. 
10 Q So in this case all we have is one party to 
\\ "he contract quitclaiming the property to the other'.' 
i: MR. CLINE: well, you're assuming facts not 
; ; ^eiorc us. You can make that argument to the court if 
:-i :hat's the case. 
15 Q (By Mr, Guzman) Under the contract, as was 
16 quoted, it says that you would demand all sums due and 
17 payable under the contract if, from what t understand, 
18 if there was an encumbrance on the property; is that not 
19 correct'7 Is that not the language of the contract? 
20 MR. CLINE: The language speaks for itself, 
21 but that's the general --
22 Q (By Mr. Guzman) Did you ever make a demanc i 
23 for all the sums due and payable under the contract to 
24 Afton or Kevin Dewitt? 
25 A On several occasions I thought about it. 
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1 Q Under this provision of the contract, 
2 regarding the encumbrance of the property, did you ever 
3 make a demand for all sums due and payable under the 
4 contract pursuant to that provision of the contract once 
5 you became aware — 
6 A I thought about it and I didn't pursue it at 
7 the time. 
8 MR. GUZMAN: Ms. Petersen? 
9 FURTHER EXAMINATION 
10 BY MS. PETERSEN: 
11 Q I would just like to bring your attention 
12 back to the telephone conversation between you and 
13 Mr. Dewitt. At the time the verbal agreement was made, 
14 do you recall how the arrangements came about of who 
15 determined ~ did you inform Mr. Dewitt of the amount of 
16 arrearages owing? 
17 A I believe that I came up with the total. 
18 Q And how did you calculate that total? 
19 A On the basis of what was owed. Payments 
20 that hadn' t been paid. 
[21 Q And how much were the regular monthly 
22 payments, do you recall? 
|23 A Well, they varied. Some months it was 300 
24 and on other months it was 252, on other occasions it 
25 was approximately 265. It varied from month to month. 
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1 Q The terms of the contract varied, or their 
2 payments varied? 
3 A The terms of the payments. The amount of 
4 payments that were made. The dollar amounts changed 
5 from month to month because of late payments and because 
6 for some reason there were months when they wanted to 
7 pay 300 a month. 
8 Q Okay. And were they paid --
9 A But the majority of the months were the 
10 agreed on amount of 252 plus the late payment. 
11 Q And when they paid S300 a month, where was 
12 that extra money going to? Was it going to — 
13 A To the payment. 
14• Q To the principal? 
15 A Principal and interest. 
16 Q And you calculated that into your figures 
17 when you gave him the arrearage amount? 
18 A Yes. 
19 Q And how many months did you calculate were 
20 in arrears when Kevin was ~ at the time of the phone 
21 call with Ogden? 
22 A The amount of the two checks. Whatever the 
23 amount was. I think the one check was a thousand and I 
24 forget the exact total of the other one. It was either 
25 600 and something or 1600. I tore the checks up so I 
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1 don't know. 
2 Q So it's your testimony then that Mr. Ogden 
3 Dewitt didn't call you and offer you $1,000 for you to 
4 hold off, but rather you told him the exact amount of 
5 what the arrearages were? 
6 A He didn't know what was owing. I told him 
7 what was owing and he told me he couldn't paid pay it at 
8 the time. 
9 MS. PETERSEN: That's all that I have at 
10 this time. 
11 FURTHER EXAMINATION 
12 BY MR. CLINE: 
13 Q Do you recall when this conversation took 
14 place regarding the amounts that would — 
15 A I'm sure he does. 
16 Q What's your recollection? 
17 A My recollection is it was in February or the 
18 latter part of January. 
19 Q How long after that did he bring down the 
20 check for SI,000? 
21 A How long after the conversation? 
22 Q Right. 
23 A It was fairly soon. 
24 Q Same day? 
25 A It seems like it was the same day, but I 
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1 could be wrong on that. 
2 Q How long after that did you talk to David 
3 Crabtree? 
4 A I think within the next 24 hours. 
5 Q A n d -
6 A And I was very upset because things were not 
7 right. 
8 Q And so when did you decide to go forward 
9 with the foreclosure? 
10 A Immediately. I told Dave that I was not 
11 going to go through with the verbal agreement that we 
12 had made over the phone because of the facts that had 
13 been named. 
14 Q Prior to the trustee's sale, did you ever 
15 talk to Ogden Dewitt on the telephone? 
16 A Prior to that, uh-huh (affirmative). 
17 Q And what did you tell Ogden Dewitt? 
18 A Prior to the trustee's sale? 
19 Q Right. And after you had decided to go 
20 forward with the trustee's sale. 
21 A I had tentatively agreed verbally to allow 
22 him to make part of the payments in the two installments 
23 basically. 
24 Q Right. This is after that tentative 
25 agreement. You had that tentative agreement, same day 
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